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1. INTRODUCTION
Health status has long been recognized as a crucial determinant of many important economic deci-
sions, including choices about whether to participate in the labor force or enroll in public transfer
programs. Yet there exists widespread concern about the reliability of self-reported health and
disability in survey datasets (e.g., Institute of Medicine, 2002). Ongoing debates about measuring
the presence of work-limiting disabilities, the e¤ects of health on labor market decisions, and the
inuence of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) policy on declining labor force participation
rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability information (e.g.,
Haveman and Wolfe (1984) vs. Parsons (1984); Bound (1991) vs. Parsons (1991)).
This paper focuses on the problem of drawing inferences on the prevalence of long-term work
disability using self-reports of work capacity. Numerous studies measure disability status based
on subjective self-reports of limitation, such as responses to questions of the form: Do you have
a health impairment that limits the kind or amount of work you can perform?We examine the
prevalence of true disabilityamong respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
survey of persons nearing retirement commonly used to evaluate the e¤ects of disability on the work
behavior of older persons. In the HRS, nearly 21% of the respondents report having a long-term
work limitation caused by a medical problem; about half of these respondents report being unable
to work altogether.1
Many researchers are skeptical of the accuracy of these self-reports. Bound and Burkhauser
(1999, p. 3446), for example, suggest the possibility that those who apply for SSDI and especially
those who are awarded benets tend to exaggerate the extent of their work limitations (relative to
those who do not apply)...Eligibility for disability transfers is specically tied to diminished work
capacity. Others (e.g., Bowe, 1993) have argued that the threshold for claiming disability may be
lower for those who nd themselves out of the labor force, either by choice or through involuntarily
unemployment. Some who have withdrawn from the labor force prior to normal retirement age
might rationalize their employment status as driven mostly by their health conditions instead of
by other factors, such as high preferences for leisure or unlucky labor market outcomes.
Studies that have modeled and assessed the reliability of self-reported work limitations have not
come to any consensus. Using a variety of parametric latent variable models to assess the impact of
health on labor market outcomes, several researchers have found evidence of systematic disability
1 In a companion paper (Kreider and Pepper, forthcoming), we consider the consequences of arbitrary classication
errors when disability status is a potentially mismeasured conditioning variable.
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reporting errors. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), and Kreider (1999, 2000), for example, estimate
large reporting errors that are related to labor force status. In contrast, Stern (1989) and Dwyer and
Mitchell (1999) accept the hypothesis that labor market outcomes do not a¤ect reporting behavior.
These conicting ndings have proved di¢ cult to reconcile. Most related studies impose what
seem to be sensible restrictions on the reporting process. As noted by Benítez-Silva et al. (2004),
however, most of the earlier approaches required strong parametric assumptions and behavioral
restrictions.
To disentangle these issues, Benítez-Silva et al. (2004) isolate the problem of inferring disability
status. Using an innovative approach that focuses on a subsample of applicants for federal disability
benets, they compare self-reports of work incapacity to the Social Security Administrations (SSA)
award decision. Under the identifying assumption that the SSAs denition of disability forms
the social standard for what constitutes work incapacity, they nd that disability self-reports are
unbiased.
Given the ongoing debates about measuring work limitations, we similarly focus on the nar-
row but complex problem of inferring disability rates from self-reported survey data. In contrast
to Benítez-Silva et al. (2004), we assess disability among the general population of individuals
nearing retirement age and thus do not observe an alternative direct measure of work limitation.
Instead, we develop and apply a nonparametric bounding methodology that allows us to assess the
identifying power of some basic assumptions about the reporting process that have been applied in
the literature.
We describe the data and di¤erent measures of limitation in Section 2. In Section 3, we de-
velop a methodological framework to infer disability in corrupt data in which we assume, initially,
that nothing is known about the patterns of reporting errors. Extending the partial identication
methods developed by Horowitz and Manski (1995), we consider what can be learned under dif-
ferent restrictions on the reporting process. This framework allows one to assess the sensitivity
of inferences about work disability to the strength of the identifying assumptions. Two classes of
assumptions are considered: rst, we consider vericationassumptions that formalize the notion
of placing more condence in some responses than others (e.g., depending on corroborating medical
evidence); and second, we consider monotone instrumental variable (MIV) assumptions that specify
monotonic relationships between the true disability rate and certain observed covariates, such as
labor force participation and age.
In Sections 4 and 5, we present results and draw conclusions. We rst study what can be learned
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about the prevalence of work disability in the general population. We then turn to inferences for
the subsample of disability insurance applicants, the group studied by Benítez-Silva et al. (2004).
Since we observe no objective measure of true work capacity, there invariably will be questions
about the credibility of any verication or MIV assumption. Thus, a primary objective is to assess
how inferences vary under di¤erent seemingly reasonable restrictions. To do so, we exploit the
wealth of information available in the HRS on health and labor market status to motivate and
assess the identifying power of di¤erent assumptions. For example, we might have more condence
that a respondent truly has a signicant work limitation if the respondent also reports a serious,
objectively diagnosed health condition that is known to be associated with disability (e.g., having
had a stroke).
2. DATA
Our analysis uses data from the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally representative
survey of 7608 households whose heads were nearing retirement age (aged 51-61) at the time of the
initial interview in 1992-93. The HRS has become an especially popular data source for studying
the e¤ects of health status and public policy on the work behavior of older persons because of its
detailed information about health and disability, work history, and participation in public transfer
programs. The rst wave is comprised of 12,652 respondents (heads and other adult household
members). As common in micro analyses of the HRS data, we restrict our sample to the 9,824
age-eligible respondents born between 1931 and 1941.
We focus on inferring long-term disability rates in the rst wave of the survey using responses
to direct questions on work limitation. HRS respondents were asked, Do you have any impairment
or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?Those who answered
in the a¢ rmative to this broad disability question were asked the more narrow question: Does
this limitation keep you from working altogether?Of the 9824 respondents, 2039 (20:8% of the
sample) reported a long-term work limitation, and 992 (10:1% of the sample) reported being unable
to work altogether. We also use information from the second wave, conducted two years after the
rst wave, to help resolve uncertainty about pending applications for federal disability benets.
Responses to these work limitation questions provide convenient summary measures of disability
and are often viewed to be more informative about work capacity than more objective yet indirect
proxies, such as the presence of specic health conditions or functional limitations (e.g., Haveman
and Wolfe, 1984).2 In particular, these direct disability questions capture the notion of both
2Using the HRS data, Benítez-Silva et al. (1999) nd that self-reported disability status constitutes a powerful
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physical and mental limitations as well as the more elusive ideas involving social context. These
ideas are reected in Nagis (1965) seminal work relating disability to the expression of a physical
or a mental limitationin a social context such as the workplace.3
Since employment and disability are not mutually exclusive, researchers interested in studying
the impact of disability on labor market behaviors have relied largely on the broader measure of
some limitation in work capacity. In some contexts, however, the more restrictive inability
to workdenition may be of more interest. For example, the SSA requires recipients of federal
disability insurance benets to demonstrate the inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least 12 months.4 In 2006, substantial gainful activity is dened as earnings exceeding $860 per
month ($500 per month during the time of the HRS survey). We estimate bounds on the disability
rates for both the broad and restrictive measure of disability.
To draw inferences on the true disability rate, we combine these self-reports of work limitation
with other information that can potentially shed light on their reliability. Table I displays means
and standard deviations for selected variables used in our analysis. As expected, labor market
and disability insurance status vary substantially with reported disability status. For example,
the employment rate among those reporting no work limitation is 78:4%, nearly 2:6 times higher
than the 29:6% employment rate among those reporting some limitation. Likewise, just over half
the respondents reporting work limitations and nearly four-fths reporting being unable to work
altogether had applied for federal disability insurance (DI) benets from the SSA, whereas very
few respondents reporting no work limitation had applied for benets.5
Although work disability is not synonymous with general health status, there is undoubtedly a
close relationship. Our analysis exploits a wealth of information on a respondents reported physical
and mental health to aid in implementation of the verication and MIV assumptions. In Table I,
we display the means of selected health-related variables by reported disability status. At the most
predictor of disability insurance applications and awards.
3This broad conceptualization of work limiting disability has been espoused by both the World Health Organization
and the framers of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). See the Institute of Medicine (2002, Chapter 2) for
further discussion of the conceptual issues in dening disability.
4U.S. Social Security Administration, 2006. Compilation of the Social Security Laws Including the Social Security
Act, as Amended, and Related Enactments, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), Section 223(d).
5The federal government provides cash and medical benets to the disabled through the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. The formal medical eligibility criteria for the
two programs are identical. Because the HRS does not distinguish between SSDI and SSI applications, we refer to
SSDI/SSI jointly as the SSAs Disability Insurance (DI) program.
4
basic level, we exploit information from two generic questions about a respondents physical and
mental health status. For example, we see that 42:3% of respondents reporting a work limitation
claim to be in fair or poor general physical health, compared with only 12:4% among those reporting
no work limitation.
Another series of health-related questions provides information on other more objective mea-
sures of limitation. To proxy for disability status, some researches have relied on indirect summary
measures like body mass (e.g., Gruber and Kubik, 1997) or subsequent mortality (e.g., Parsons,
1980). In our sample, 3:0% of respondents died before the second interview, and 58:9% have a
body mass outside the ideal range dened by Fahey et al. (1997). These measures of limitation are
clearly associated with self-reports of disability. The mortality rate, for example, is more than four
times higher among those reporting a work limitation (7:5% compared with 1:8%) and more than
ve times higher among those reporting an inability to work at all (11% compared with 2:1%).
Beyond these indirect proxy measures of limitation, the HRS includes a battery of direct ques-
tions related to a respondents ability to perform basic functions. Activities of daily living indicators
(ADLs) are intended to measure the ability to undertake basic self-care functions such as eating
or dressing without help. Instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) are intended to measure
capabilities relevant to independent living, such as the ability to travel beyond walking distance.
Such limitations do not directly measure work disability, but they may often contribute to di¢ cul-
ties in performing job-related tasks. Using denitions suggested by Loporest et al. (1995, p. S297),
we aggregate this information into an index of functional limitations ranging from Level 0 : no func-
tional limitation, to Level 6 : cannot do one of the basic life functions (see Table III for details). As
expected, respondents reporting work limitations are more inclined to report functional limitations.
Still, these measures seem to reect di¤erent aspects of reported impairment. For example, 13:9%
of those reporting a work limitation and 4:7% of those reporting the inability to work altogether
do not report di¢ culty with any of the activities.
Finally, we exploit self-reported information on the presence of specic clinical health conditions.
Following Wallace and Herzog (1995), we focus on a subset of seventeen reported conditions in the
HRS that are expected to be the most prevalent among middle-aged and elderly persons and/or
most likely to result in work disability. Across all of the 17 conditions we consider (see Table I,
notes d and e), respondents who report a work limitation report an average of 4:02 conditions
compared with 1:58 conditions among those reporting no work limitation.
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3. CLASSIFICATION ERROR MODEL
While the work limitation questions are notably ambiguous, survey designers clearly have an
expectation that respondents will be able to place these questions in a reasonable social context.
When a survey asks whether a respondent is unable to work altogether, for example, it is un-
derstood that the respondent might reasonably answer yeseven though hypothetically it might
be possible to perform some small amount of work. The threshold for answering in the a¢ rmative
depends on current social norms for what constitutes an inability to work (see, e.g., Kapteyn et al.,
forthcoming).
The problem is that some respondents might use a di¤erent threshold for assessing disability.
While it seems unlikely that a signicant number of survey respondents are prone to willfully
misrepresent their work capacity, a much greater concern in the literature revolves around the
possibility that social or psychological factors can lead to self-rationalization (see, e.g., Bound and
Burkhauser, 1999). Concerns over systematic misreporting are generally based on two observations,
one nancial and one social. First, eligibility for government disability assistance programs is tied to
both earnings and disability status. Second, some people may feel social pressure to be working until
normal retirement age. Thus, short of intentionally misreporting, some nonworkers or disability
insurance applicants might have a di¤erent threshold for equating a health condition with a work
limitation. To help rationalize a nonemployment spell, for example, nonworkers might be more
prone than workers to interpret a particular medical problem (e.g., a bad back of a given severity)
as a work limitation. At the same time, other respondents might not wish to admit that they are
having di¢ culty coping with a health condition, so they might claim to be able-bodied despite
having a substantial work limitation.
Formally, let X = 1 if the respondent reports a disability and 0 otherwise. Let W = 1 indicate
that the individual is truly disabled relative to the intent of the survey question, with W = 0
otherwise. Finally, let Z indicate whether a respondent provides accurate information, with Z = 1
if W = X and Z = 0 otherwise. We are interested in making inferences on the unobserved true
disability rate, P (W = 1).
Some fraction, P (X = 1; Z = 0), inaccurately report being disabled (false positives) while
others, P (X = 0; Z = 0), inaccurately report being nondisabled (false negatives). Thus, the true
and reported disability rates are related as follows:
P (W = 1) = P (X = 1) + P (X = 0; Z = 0)  P (X = 1; Z = 0). (1)
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The observed disability rate equals the true disability rate if the fraction of false negative reports
exactly o¤sets the fraction of false positive reports. The data, however, only identify the fraction
of the population that self-reports disability, P (X = 1). The sampling process cannot identify the
fraction of false negative or false positive reports.
As a starting point, it is useful to evaluate what can be inferred about the disability rate
P (W = 1) given prior information on the fraction of respondents who provide valid self-reports. In
particular, suppose
P (Z = 1)  v (2)
where v is a known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate. By varying the value of v, we can
consider the wide range of views characterizing the debate on inaccurate reporting. Those willing
to assume fully accurate reporting can set v = 1, in which case the sampling process identies
the disability rate. Those uncomfortable with placing any lower bound on the fraction of accurate
responses (e.g., Myers, 1982; Bowe, 1993) can set v = 0, in which case the sampling process is
uninformative. Middle ground positions are evaluated by setting v somewhere between 0 and 1.
Given the restriction that no more than some fraction, 1   v, of the population misreports
disability status, we know from (1) that
maxfP (X = 1)  (1  v); 0g  P (W = 1)  minfP (X = 1) + (1  v); 1g. (3)
These bounds are derived by Horowitz and Manski (1995, Proposition, Corollary 1.2). Henceforth,
we will refer to these bounds as the HM bounds. Intuitively, the bounds narrow as the upper bound
misreporting rate, 1  v, declines.
In the HRS sample, 20:8% of respondents report some work limitation. The bounds in (3)
reveal that this self-reported disability measure provides only modest information about the true
disability rate unless v is large. In fact, the HM bounds remain completely uninformative unless it
is known that the accurate reporting rate exceeds 20:8%; the lower bound is zero unless it is known
that at least 79:2% of responses are accurate.
3.1. PARTIAL VERIFICATION OF OBSERVED SUBGROUPS
Short of assuming fully accurate reporting, a number of researchers combine distributional
restrictions with assumptions of fully accurate disability self-reports within particular groups of
respondents. Kreider (1999) and McGarry (2004), for example, explicitly assume that workers
provide fully accurate responses, remaining agnostic about the self-reports from nonworkers. In
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the spirit of these ideas, we evaluate what can be inferred about the true disability rate when prior
information is brought to bear on the degree of misreporting within certain observed subgroups.
For now, we focus on basic notation. Our specic verication strategies are presented in Section 4.
To formalize the notion of partial verication, let Y = 1 indicate that a respondent belongs to
a veried subgroup, with Y = 0 otherwise. Using the law of total probability, we can decompose
the true disability rate by subgroups:
P (W = 1) = P (W = 1jY = 1)P (Y = 1) + P (W = 1jY = 0)P (Y = 0). (4)
Although respondents in the veried subgroups might have few incentives to misreport, there may
remain random errors: respondents may make mistakes in assessing the disability threshold, valid
reports can be miscoded, and so forth. We allow for the possibility of exogenous response errors
within the veried group such that there can be partial verication.6 Formally, let vy be the known
lower bound fraction of accurate reporters in the veried subgroup and assume that at least half of
the veried group reports accurately: P (Z = 1jY = 1)  vy  12 .7 Let the reporting errors in the
veried group be random so that P (W = 1jY = 1) = P (W = 1jY = 1; Z). No prior information
is assumed about the validity of self-reports from the unveried cases. Then the following bounds
apply (see the appendix for a proof):8
Proposition 1: If P (Z = 1jY = 1)  vy  12 for a known vy and P (W = 1jZ; Y = 1) = P (W =
1jY = 1), it follows that

0


vy   P (X = 0jY = 1)
2vy   1 + (1  )P (X = 1jY = 1)

P (Y = 1)
 P (W = 1)  (5)

1

P (X = 1jY = 1) + (1  )vy   P (X = 0jY = 1)
2vy   1

+ (1  
1
)

P (Y = 1) + P (Y = 0).
where i = 1 [vy > P (X = ijY = 1)], i = 0; 1 and  = 1[P (X = 0jY = 1) > P (X = 1jY = 1).
By varying the value of vy, we can assess the sensitivity of the bounds to the strength of the
verication assumption. In the special case that all respondents in veried groups are known to
6Dominitz and Sherman (2004) consider the case of full verication for certain subpopulations.
7The assumption that at least half the reports are accurate is applied by Bollinger (1996) and others and seems
consistent with the notion of verication.
8Molinari (2005) independently derives a similar result using a di¤erent approach. She shows that the relationship
between the distribution of a true variable and its mismeasured counterpart can be represented by a system of
equations involving a coe¢ cient matrix of misclassication probabilities. Restrictions on this matrix can be used
to partially identify regions for the true variable. Kreider (2005) provides graphical motivation for these bounds by
appealing to restrictions on the patterns of false positives and false negatives.
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provide accurate reports (vy = 1) then
P (X = 1; Y = 1)  P (W = 1)  P (X = 1; Y = 1) + P (Y = 0). (6)
In this informational setting, the true disability rate is intuitively no less than the reported rate
among veried cases and no greater than this rate plus the fraction of unveried cases.
3.2. MONOTONICITY ASSUMPTIONS
The bounds in Equation (5) can be further narrowed when combined with monotonicity as-
sumptions linking disability and observed covariates. Consider, for example, age and disability.
The incidence of many debilitating health conditions rises with age, and many health conditions
are persistent once developed. The resulting tendency for individuals to accumulate health prob-
lems over time suggests that the population disability rate is nondecreasing in age.
To formalize the age monotonicity assumption, let u measure the age of the respondent and
let LB(u) and UB(u) be the known lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available
information on the true disability rate, P (W = 1ju): Age is a monotone instrumental variable
(MIV) if the true disability rate weakly increases with u. Under this restriction, Manski and
Pepper (2000, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1) show that
sup
u0u1
LB(u1)  P (W = 1ju = u0)  inf
u0u2
UB(u2): (7)
There are no other restrictions implied by the MIV assumption. The MIV bound on the uncondi-
tional disability rate, P (W = 1), is easily obtained using the law of total probability (Manski and
Pepper, 2000).
3.3. ESTIMATION
The Proposition 1 bounds are functions of various nonparametrically estimable probabilities and
thus can be consistently estimated by plugging-in the sample analogs. Estimation of the MIV
bounds, however, is complicated by the fact that the monotonicity restrictions in Equation (7)
must be imposed over collections of various estimates. For example, in our application, we divide
the sample into 39 age groups containing 252 respondents per group (251 in four of the groups).
In nite samples, plug-in estimators that take supremums and inmums are systematically biased.
In our application, the estimated bounds will be too narrow because the lower bound estimate is
upward-biased and the upper bound estimate is downward-biased.
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To measure and correct for this bias, we employ a modied estimator that uses a nonparametric
bootstrap bias correction. The basic idea is straightforward. Let Tn be a consistent analog estimator
of some unknown parameter  such that the bias of this estimator is bn = E(Tn)   . Using
the bootstrap distribution of Tn, one can estimate this bias as bb = E(Tn)   Tn where E() is
the expectation operator with respect to the bootstrap distribution.9 A bootstrap bias-corrected
estimator then follows as T cn = Tn   bb = 2Tn  E(Tn). See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for
a general description of the bootstrap bias correction and Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming) for
further details.
The bootstrap is also used to provide a tractable way to form condence intervals for our
estimated bounds on the disability rate. To do this, we rst apply the percentile-bootstrap method
(bias-corrected) to derive 90% condence intervals for the upper and lower bounds (see Efron
and Tibshirani, 1993). The interval on the lower bound, for example, is dened by the 0:05 and
0:95 quantiles of the bootstrap distribution of the estimated bound. A Bonferroni joint condence
interval with a level of at least 90% is then derived by taking by the 0:05 quantile from the bootstrap
distribution of the lower bound estimator and the 0:95 quantile of the distribution of the upper
bound estimator.
4. SPECIFIC STRATEGIES AND RESULTS
In this section, we provide details about our specic verication strategies and present empirical
results. Throughout, we report estimated HM bounds, verication bounds, and MIV bounds. We
begin by considering the problem of drawing inferences on the broader denition of disability
involving some limitation in the kind or amount of work that can be performed. In Section 4.1,
we bound the true disability rate under two di¤erent sets of verication assumptions. In Section
4.2, we assess identication decay when requiring that the subjective disability response must be
corroborated by more objective measures of functional limitation. For example, one could decide
not to verify work limitation among respondents who report no functional limitation. Finally, in
Section 4.3 we consider drawing inferences on work incapacity, the more restrictive denition of
work disability. Focusing on the subpopulation of disability insurance applicants, we assess whether
the data provide any evidence of bias in the SSA award decision.
9For our application, we randomly draw with replacement from the empirical distribution 10; 000 independent
pseudo-samples of the original data.
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4.1 VERIFICATION STRATEGIES
Many researchers have argued that the propensity to provide inaccurate reports of work limita-
tion may be linked to particular observed groups of respondents. Researchers have argued that the
extent of response errors is likely to vary by employment status (e.g., Stern, 1989; Kreider, 1999;
McGarry, 2004), applications to and participation in government disability insurance programs
(Bound and Burkhauser, 1999; Kreider, 2000), reported disability status (Institute of Medicine,
2002), and other observed covariates. Following this theme, we evaluate what can be learned about
the true disability rate when certain observed groups are assumed to provide accurate responses,
or at least to provide some lower bound degree of accurate reporting.
When formulating verication strategies, we borrow from the basic ideas contained in the ex-
isting literature but, at the same time, thoroughly examine the extensive health and labor market
information available in the HRS. We aim to verify self-reported disability status for cases that
appear to be the most credible and to not verify cases that involve some type of ambiguity or
inconsistency. For example, previous studies have veried the self-reports of workers under the
premise that workers face few incentives to misreport. But of the 6503 respondents reporting to
be gainfully employed, 733 report elsewhere in the survey either zero hours, zero earnings, or be-
ing nonemployed. Given these labor market inconsistencies, we do not verify the work limitation
responses of such individuals based on employment status alone (they might be veried based on
other information). Likewise, we do not verify the responses of the 58 individuals who claimed to
be able-bodied in one part of the survey but disabled or receiving disability benets in another part
of the survey.
Given the inherent uncertainty about which responses should be veried, we present two di¤erent
models of partial verication. Model I involves relatively strong verication assumptions, some of
which are relaxed in Model II. We begin with the broad measure of disability involving some work
limitation. For Model I, we treat disability status reports of X as veried (with discussion below)
for:
1. those currently working for pay (HRS variable V2717=1) except those who (a) report that
they receive disability benets from any program, (b) did not check the working box in
question F1a (variable V2701) for current employment status, or (c) do not report positive
labor hours and positive earnings (i.e., either value is zero or missing);
2. those reporting no work limitation (X = 0), except those who (a) report receiving disability
benets or (b) checked disabledin box F1d (variable V2701) for current employment status;
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3. those reporting a work limitation (X = 1) if they also report being unable to work altogether
due to one of the six serious health conditions identied by Wallace and Herzog (1995, p.S90);
4. disability beneciaries (reporting X = 1), except those who report that they are (a) currently
working or (b) able to work.10
In Model I, 91:9% of the sample is veried. Borrowing from the existing literature, we verify
the responses of most workers and of most respondents reporting to be able-bodied. In both cases,
there appear to be few economic or psychological factors that would lead to misreporting. However,
in each case exceptions are made for potentially conicting information. The responses of workers
who receive disability benets are not veried, nor does employment status confer verication if
there exists contradictory information on labor hours or earnings. Similarly, we verify X = 0 cases
except in the face of contradictory evidence that the respondent is receiving disability benets or
reports being disabled earlier in the survey. We verify the presence of at least some work limitation,
X = 1, if the respondent reports complete work incapacity caused by a health condition that is
known to often be debilitating and associated with relatively few false positive diagnoses.
Verication of disability beneciaries is a more subtle matter. Our maintained assumption is
that, in the absence of labor force participation, the receipt of disability benets among those
claiming to be unable to work at all corroborates the existence of at least some work limitation.
Many have raised concerns that beneciaries are inclined to exaggerate the extent of their limitations
and that disability awards are prone to classication errors. Verifying some work limitation among
this subset of beneciaries, however, does not imply that the awards process is without error or that
beneciaries do not exaggerate the extent of disability; it only requires that adjudication errors are
not so extreme that beneciaries who report complete work incapacity are not work-limited at all.
Model II relaxes some of these assumptions. In particular, in Model II responses are unveried
as follows: (1) proxy responses are never veried (5% of our sample), (2)X = 0 cases are not veried
if the respondent (a) reports pain of at least moderate severity, at its worst, that makes activities
di¢ cult or (b) has one of the six serious medical conditions and reports being limited in housework
or other activities besides paid work, and (3) X = 1 cases are no longer veried based on reporting
one of the six serious health conditions. Under these more conservative assumptions, at least 78:4%
of the sample is known to provide accurate responses.
10For this purpose, beneciaries include all respondents who reported receiving disability benets from any public
or private program. Respondents were queried about the receipt of disability benets from a variety of programs
(e.g., SSDI, SSI, VeteransDisability, State disability program,Employer/union plan).
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4.1.A VERIFICATION BOUNDS
Table II presents the estimated bounds for the true disability rate and their conservative 90%
condence intervals. Column A provides results under the corrupt sampling assumption alone.
Under both Models I and II, the bounds reect much uncertainty about the true disability rate. If
at least 91:9% of respondents are known to provide accurate reports, for example, the HM bounds
constrain the true disability rate to lie within [0:127; 0:288]. Without additional information about
the reporting process, the disability rate may lie anywhere within this 16 point range.
In this setting, one function of the bounds is to test the validity of alternative measures of
disability and models of the reporting error process. If the verication assumptions are correct,
estimates lying signicantly outside the bounds cannot be valid measures of true disability. Table
I contains various possible measures of work limiting disability. Most notably, the self-reported
disability rate of 20:8% lies within the 16 point range and thus cannot be rejected as being an
accurate measure of true disability. Neither, however, can we reject the possibility that the fraction
of respondents reporting to be in fair or poor physical health (18:6%), the fraction reporting to
be in poor mental health (22:7%), or the fraction reporting to have one of the six serious medical
conditions (27:3%), are valid measures of work disability. In contrast, the incidence of non-ideal
body mass (58:9%) and the subsequent mortality rate (3:0%), lie far outside of the estimated
bounds. Thus, given the assumption that at least 91:9% of respondents provide accurate self-
reports, we nd that these alternative measures do not reveal the incidence of work disabilities.
Still, in a regression framework, these measures might serve as important control variables for
health and limitation, and perhaps as valid instrumental variables for the true disability rate.
Column B displays estimated bounds under the assumption that all veried respondents provide
accurate self-reports of disability. The verication assumption provides substantial identifying
power, but the specics are quite sensitive to the underlying model. Under Model I, the bounds
narrow to the seven point range of [0:135; 0:215], a 50% reduction in the width of the bounds. In
this case, the fraction reporting to be in poor mental health and the fraction reporting a serious
medical condition lie outside of the bounds, and thus cannot be valid measures of work limiting
disability if the model is correct. However, the width of the verication bounds increases by three-
fold when we move from Model I, where 91:9% of respondents are veried, to Model II, where
78:4% of respondents are veried. These changes in the underlying assumptions about the nature
and extent of reporting errors generate large changes in the uncertainty about the disability rate.
Although the verication bounds can be substantially more informative than the HM bounds,
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they provide only limited information on the true disability rate unless a large fraction of the
sample is veried to provide completely accurate information. When we relax the parametric
restrictions applied in much of the literature and isolate the identifying power of the verication
assumptions, there remains much uncertainty about the true disability rate. These results support
concerns raised by Benítez-Silva et al. (2004) that conclusions about reporting errors based on
latent variable models (e.g., Kreider, 1999; McGarry, 2004) could be driven largely by parametric
assumptions. Even in light of this uncertainty, however, we nd that some alternative disability
measures appear to capture di¤erent dimensions of health or limitation.
4.1.B MIV BOUNDS
Uncertainty about the disability rate can be reduced at the cost of imposing stronger assump-
tions. In this section, we combine verication assumptions with MIV restrictions and illustrate how
inferences vary across the di¤erent assumptions. First, we combine the assumption that true dis-
ability weakly increases with age, as discussed above, with the restriction that the disability rate is
no higher among the employed than among the nonemployed: P (W = 1jL = 0)  P (W = 1jL = 1),
where L indicates whether a respondent participates in the labor market. Second, we combine this
employment monotonicity assumption with an assumption that tted values from an ordered pro-
bit model of federal disability applications comprise an MIV. In particular, a natural MIV can be
constructed as the outcome of a respondents Disability Insurance application decision. Let this
variable equal 0 if the respondent has not applied for disability benets, 1 if a disability application
was rejected, 2 if an application was accepted after appeal, and 3 if an application was accepted ini-
tially. Using this variable, we constructed an MIV as the tted values from an ordered probit model
that exploits information from attributes expected to inuence work disability. The specication
includes indicators for each of the 17 health conditions identied by Wallace and Herzog (1995),
indicators for the functional limitation index (Levels 1-6), the indicator for subsequent mortality
(died before wave 2), the indicator for ideal body mass, the indicator for being often bothered by
pain, along with age, education, race, gender, marital status, veteran status, and asset level (details
from this regression are available upon request).
The MIV estimates are reported in Columns C and D of Table II. These MIV assumptions have
substantial identifying power. Under the age-employment MIV assumption, the Model I bounds
on the work limitation rate, for example, collapse to the three point range [0:178; 0:204], while the
DI-employment MIV shrinks the bounds to [0:149; 0:193]. In these cases, the self-reported disability
rate, 0:208, lies outside of these bounds for the true disability rate and just on the edge of the upper
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bound of the conservative 90% condence interval. Thus, if the MIV assumptions are valid, these
estimates provide some evidence of misreporting. In particular, since the unveried group consists
primarily of nonworkers who claim to be disabled, we nd some support for suggestions in the
literature that members of this group systematically over-report disability.11
As before, however, the identication bounds decay rapidly as we relax the verication restric-
tions. The width of the age-employment MIV bound, for example, increases from the three point
range in Model I to a nearly 16 point range, [0:129; 0:285], in Model II. Thus, under the Model II
verication assumptions, there is much uncertainty about the true disability rate. In this case, the
self-reported disability rate of 20:8% lies within the estimated bounds, but so too does the fraction
of respondents reporting to be in fair or poor physical or emotional health (18:6% or 22:7%) and
the fraction reporting to have one of the six serious medical conditions (27:3%). The estimated
bounds are quite sensitive to the underlying assumptions; we generally cannot reject the possibility
that self-reports are unbiased.
4.2 FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
We now investigate the sensitivity of the estimated bounds to assumptions linking work dis-
ability to functional limitation. Measures of physical limitation in the HRS might corroborate
verication assumptions on self-reported disability. As noted in Section 2, disparities between
these health-related measures do not imply that either measure is invalid. Still, inconsistencies
might argue against verication. For example, respondents with severe functional limitations who
report being able-bodied might not be veried as providing accurate reports of disability.
To study the sensitivity of the estimated bounds, we trace out the implications of a corroboration
strategy that uses self-reports of functional limitation to weaken the verication assumptions. If
a researcher believes that responses to questions about functional limitation provide no further
evidence about work disability, then the results presented in Table II apply. Otherwise, apparent
inconsistencies between reports of functional limitation and work limitation serve to caution against
verication.
Table III displays the estimated bounds for verication Models I and II under the age-employment
MIV assumption. The lower bound decreases the case where respondents are not veried if they
11Bound and Waidmann (2002), for example, observe that the fraction of working-aged men who identify themselves
as work-limited nonworkers closely tracks the fraction receiving SSDI benets (rising in the 1970s, falling in the 1980s,
and rising again in the 1990s). Finding no parallel changes in reported disability among respondents older than 65
(who would be ineligible for SSDI benets), they argue that exogenous changes in the availability of disability benets
appear to induce changes in disability reporting behavior.
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report being disabled with a su¢ ciently low functional limitation index value (i.e., a value less than
or equal to the particular level of ), and the upper bound increases when respondents are not
veried if they report being able-bodied with a su¢ ciently high functional limitation value (i.e., a
value greater than or equal to the specied level of ). When we do not verify respondents claiming
to be disabled but also claiming to have no functional limitations ( = 6), for example, the lower
bound decreases from 0:178 to 0:166. The lower bound falls further to 0:114 when respondents with
some di¢ culty with work functions ( = 3) are not veried. When we do not verify respondents
claiming to be able-bodied yet also having a severe functional limitation ( = 6), the upper bound
barely increases from 0:204 to 0:205. However, when we do not verify cases involving at least some
di¢ culty with basic work functions ( = 3), the upper bound increases to 0:398.
Inferences are clearly sensitive to how one models and assesses the relationship between reports
of functional and work limitation. Identication decays rapidly if disparities between these two
measures are taken to cast doubt on the validity of the self-reports of work limitation. Stated
di¤erently, to the extent that self-reported limitation responses are believed to be mostly reliable,
we provide evidence that indicators of work limitation and functional limitation are measuring very
di¤erent aspects of impairment.
4.3 WORK INCAPACITY AND THE SSA AWARD PROCESS
Thus far, we have focused on the problem of inferring the prevalence of impairment that limits
the kind or amount of work that can be undertaken. While this conceptualization is widely utilized
in research applications, the more restrictive denition of work limitation is of interest in some
settings. For example, Benítez-Silva et al. (2004) take the SSAs denition of disability  the
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity(see Section 2) as the basis for the social
standard for what constitutes work incapacity. In our HRS sample, 10:1% of respondents report
they are unable to work altogether. In this section, we rst use the methods developed above
to place bounds on the true fraction of respondents nearing retirement age who are incapable of
work. We then turn our attention to the subsample of DI applicants to assess whether SSA award
outcomes are consistent with this conceptualization of disability.
Our verication assumptions for the unable to work altogethercase are similar to those de-
scribed in Model I for some work limitation,with several notable di¤erences. Given the restrictive
nature of this disability conceptualization, we impose stronger standards for verifying disability and
impose weaker standards for verifying nondisability. A self-report of work incapacity (X = 1) is
veried if the respondent is receiving disability benets and reports one of the six aforementioned
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diagnosed serious conditions. The self-reported ability to work is veried unless the respondent
reports being nonemployed, having some work limitation, and receiving disability benets. Under
these assumptions, self-reports of work capacity are veried for 93:5% of the sample.
Table IV presents the base results. As before, we nd that the verication and MIV restrictions
confer substantial identifying power. The HM bounds conne the disability rate to the 13 point
range [0:036; 0:166], whereas the verication bounds lie within the 6 point range [0:044; 0:109].
These bounds shrink further to the four point range [0:049; 0:089] under the age-employment MIV
assumption. As before, the MIV bounds do not contain the self-reported rate of 10:1%, a nding
that is robust to some departure from full verication. These verication bounds, however, decay
further after requiring some corroborating information about functional limitation. When using
function limitation Level 3 as our corroboration cuto¤ (some di¢ culty with physical or sedentary
work functions), the lower bound falls from 0:049 to 0:040 and the upper bound increases from
0:089 to 0:362.
The restrictive denition of work disability is particularly germane for the subpopulation of DI
applicants who, to be awarded benets, must demonstrate the inability to engage in substantial
gainful activity. By focusing on this group of respondents, our bounding approach can supplement
insights into the validity of the DI award process. To obtain disability benets, applicants provide
detailed medical, income, and asset information to a federal SSA o¢ ce. Eligibility is strict, and
many applicants are denied benets on the grounds that they do not meet the medical severity
criteria. The accuracy of this process has been the subject of both political and academic debate.
Using HRS data on DI applications, awards, and receipt, we compare the fraction of beneciaries
to the estimated bounds on the true prevalence of work incapacity. Bounds on the true rate of work
incapacity among this subgroup may provide evidence about the accuracy of SSA award decisions.
If the award process accurately determines the rate at which applicants are unable to engage in
gainful activity, then the fraction of beneciaries should lie within the estimated bounds on the
true disability rate. If the fraction of beneciaries instead lies outside of the bounds, then we can
reject the joint hypothesis that the SSA award process is accurate and forms the basis for the social
denition of work incapacity. Like Benítez-Silva et al.s (2004) test of Rational Unbiased Reporting,
we test for accurate award decisions on average, not for a particular individual.
Among the 9824 age-eligible respondents in the HRS, 1082 had applied for DI benets prior
to the rst interview. The ultimate award decision, which can take a few months to a few years
to be resolved, is discerned using information from the rst two waves of the HRS. For success-
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ful applicants, we also document whether the respondent was receiving (or scheduled to receive)
benets during the Wave 1 interview. This allows us to compare self-reported disability status
with concurrent determination of DI eligibility. Of the 1082 disability applicants, 452 were initially
awarded benets and 617 were initially denied. The award decision was not available in Wave 1
for an additional 13 cases, but Wave 2 information indicates that only one of these applications
was ultimately successful.12 Of the 617 initially denied cases, 430 continued through the appeals
process, and 263 of these appeals were successful.13 Of those awarded benets, 75 recipients were
no longer participating in the program by Wave 1 of the survey. Therefore, we nd that 641 re-
spondents (59:2% of the applicant pool) were receiving or scheduled to receive benets at the time
the questions about work limitation were asked.
Since the HRS collects disability status information at discrete times that do not necessarily
coincide with the time of the application and award decisions for DI benets, an important issue is
the relevant window of observation. We compare data on self-reports and SSA award decisions for
two di¤erent time windows. First, we consider the subgroup of all (age-eligible) HRS respondents
who applied to receive DI benets regardless of when the application was led. Second, we focus
on the much smaller subsample of 233 applicants whose most recent SSA adjudication date lies
within six months of the Wave 1 interview date. For both observation windows, self-reported work
incapacity and DI beneciary status generally concur, but this is not always true. Nearly 33% of
respondents in the larger sample and 43% of respondents in the smaller sample provide self-reports
that di¤er from the DI outcome. A relatively small number of respondents report that they can
work despite receiving benets. A larger number report that they cannot work and are not receiving
DI benets. Thus, a notably larger fraction of applicants classify themselves as being unable to
work 73% in the full sample and 79% using the shorter horizon than report the current receipt
of disability benets 59% and 47%, respectively.14
12Of the remaining 12 cases, ve respondents indicated in Wave 2 that they had been denied benets. We classied
the other seven cases as denied as well: none reported receiving benets in either wave, and we found no indication
of pending decisions.
13By Wave 1 of the survey, 259 appeals were successful and 162 were not successful. For the remaining nine cases,
we used Wave 2 information to classify four applications as ultimately successful and the rest unsuccessful. The
decision whether to appeal was unavailable for three applicants; we classied each case as ultimately rejected based
on evidence from Wave 2.
14Benítez-Silva et al. (2004) nd the marginal distribution of the ultimate DI award outcome to be very similar to
the marginal distribution of self-classied work incapacity status. There are several notable di¤erences between the
sampling frames and assignment rules that may explain these di¤erences. First, whereas we focus on respondents in
the rst wave of the survey, Benítez-Silva et al. use the rst three waves. Second, Benítez-Silva et al. do not restrict
the sample to age-eligible respondents nearing retirement age. Third, Benítez-Silva et al. dene an observation
window that restricts attention to individuals who applied for DI benets within a one-year window surrounding the
interview date (6 months before and after). Finally, whereas we classify outcomes based on the current receipt of DI
benets, Benítez-Silva et al. classify outcomes based on whether the applicant was approved to receive benets.
18
Table V presents the bounds on the true work incapacity rate for both observation windows.
Verication bounds are provided in both cases, and the age-employment MIV bounds are provided
for the larger subpopulation of all age-eligible HRS applicants. The MIV estimates are unreliable
when using the smaller sample of 233 respondents. In all cases, the estimated bounds are rather
wide, and in all cases the bounds include the DI beneciary rate. Consider the tightest bounds found
under the MIV assumptions. For the subsample of all age-eligible HRS applicants, we estimate the
true work incapacity rate to lie within [0:505; 0:751]. Since the bounds overlap with the fraction of
applicants that was deemed eligible for assistance (59%), we nd no evidence of bias of the SSA
award decision under the maintained assumptions. Thus, without additional information on the
reporting process, we cannot reject the possibility that the true work incapacity rate equals the DI
beneciary rate of around 60%. Nor, however, can we reject the possibility the true rate equals the
self-reported work incapacity rate of 73%.
5. CONCLUSION
While questions have been raised about the validity of many self-reported measures, surveys of
disability have been especially controversial. Quantifying disability is conceptually di¢ cult, and
there is no commonly accepted gold standard for its measurement. Systematic response errors can
arise if a persons self-assessed disability status is inuenced by economic or psychological factors.
The nature and extent of these errors has been debated in the academic literature for more than two
decades since Anderson and Burkhauser (1984) characterized disability measurement problems in
micro survey datasets as the major unsettled issue in the empirical literature on the labor supply
of older workers. Today, especially since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in
1990, the use of these self-reports in guiding public policy has become a matter of growing public
concern. The National Council on Disability (NCD, 2002), for example, argues that the use of self-
reported disability information can lead to dangerous public policy decisions. The Council goes so
far as to suggest that the federal government should not support the dissemination of self-reported
work limitation data due to a lack of acceptable methods for assessing disabilities (see also Myers,
1982 and Bowe, 1993).
Yet despite these concerns, these self-reports seem to provide valuable information about work
capacity beyond that captured in alternative measures of health. More objectivemeasures may
be less prone to classication error, yet they may also contain far less information about work
capacity than responses to direct questions about a persons ability to work. Respondents have an
opportunity to place their health limitations in a useful social context. Some of our results suggest,
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for example, that indicators of work limitation and functional limitation are measuring markedly
di¤erent aspects of health status.
This paper provides a methodology for partially identifying work disability rates using self-
reports of limitation. Our framework allows us to explore the identifying power of a range of
di¤erent assumptions that bridge the gap between completely discarding the data (e.g., as suggested
by the NCD) and taking all of the data at face value. Our results help reveal the nature and extent
to which our knowledge about the prevalence of disability is limited by our lack of understanding
of reporting errors. Under strong assumptions, we are able to nearly identify the disability rate.
Identication deteriorates as the identifying assumptions are relaxed.
The patterns of identication decay are striking. Without strong prior information on the nature
and degree of accurate reporting, the bounds can be frustratingly wide. Moreover, the bounds can
be sensitive to relatively minor changes in the underlying classication error models. The results
are especially sensitive to how one models potential inconsistencies between the subjective self-
assessments of work limitation and more objective measures of functional limitation. In cases
where we can only bound the parameter to lie within a wide range, we must either accept a large
degree of uncertainty or be willing to impose stronger identifying assumptions.
The Institute of Medicine (2002) has called for more methodological research on these measure-
ment issues. We hope that our nonparametric bounding framework can be used as a stepping stone
for resolving the uncertainty about how best to measure work limitations and model disability,
labor supply, and the receipt of public transfers.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify notation, let the conditioning on the veried subgroup, Y = 1, be implicit. Then the
law of total probability implies:
P (X = 1) = P (W = 1jZ = 1)P (Z = 1) + P (W = 0jZ = 0)P (Z = 0): (8)
The independence assumption requires P (W = 0jZ = 1) = P (W = 0jZ = 0): Substituting for
P (W = 0jZ = 0) in (8) and using the fact that W is binary, it follows that P (X = 1) = P (W =
1jZ = 1) [2P (Z = 1)  1] + [1  P (Z = 1)]. Therefore,
P (W = 1) = P (W = 1jZ = 1) = P (X = 1)  1 + P (Z = 1)
2P (Z = 1)  1 =
P (Z = 1)  P (X = 0)
2P (Z = 1)  1 :
Although P (Z) is unknown, we know that vy  P (Z = 1)  1: Thus, we can bound the disability
rate by assessing P (W = 1jZ = 1) across the possible values of P (Z = 1). It follows that if
vy  P (X = 0), the lower bound on the true disability rate is zero. Likewise, if vy  P (X = 1),
the upper bound is one. Otherwise, di¤erentiating this equation with respect to P (Z) reveals that
if P (X = 0) > P (X = 1), then P (W = 1) is increasing in P (Z = 1) for all conjectured values of
P (Z = 1) > P (X = 0). Otherwise, it is decreasing in P (Z = 1). 
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Table I.  Selected Means and Standard Deviations 
  
    
Reported Work 
Limitation?  
Reported Inability to 
Work Altogether? 
  Full Sample  Yes  No  Yes  No 
  N=9824   N=2039  N=7785  N=992  N=8832 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
Age  56.0    3.18  56.4  55.9  56.6  55.9 
Female  53.2    0.499  53.8  53.0  52.6  53.2 
Nonwhite    0.286    0.452    0.359    0.267    0.435    0.269 
Currently working for pay    0.683    0.465    0.296*    0.784    0.000*    0.759 
Ever applied for SSDI/SSI benefits    0.110    0.313    0.528*    0.001    0.792*    0.034 
Currently receive SSDI/SSI benefits    0.065    0.246    0.311*    0.000    0.537*    0.012 
Currently receive disability benefits from  any program    0.073    0.260    0.351*    0.000    0.586*    0.016 
Health Status             
Reported fair/poor general health statusa    0.186    0.389    0.423*    0.124    0.535*    0.147 
Reported fair/poor emotional health statusa    0.227    0.419    0.651*    0.115    0.824*    0.160 
Died prior to second wave    0.030    0.171    0.075*    0.018    0.111*    0.021 
Body mass index out of ideal rangeb    0.589    0.492    0.622*    0.580    0.628*    0.584 
ADL/IADL functional limitation index (0-6)c    1.51    1.84    3.34*    1.04    3.98*    1.24 
    Level 0: No functional limitation    0.540    0.498    0.139*    0.645    0.047*    0.595 
    Level 6: Very difficult/can't do one of the basic functions    0.022    0.145    0.092*    0.003    0.150*    0.007 
Number of reported debilitating health conditionsd, e    2.08    1.92    4.02*    1.58    4.63*    1.78 
Reported a severe condition e    0.273    0.446    0.593*    0.190    0.712*    0.224 
*,†Significant  difference between the “yes” and “no” responses at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
aOther categories include excellent, very good, and good health status.; bIdeal body mass is defined as 20-25 kg/m2 following Fahey et al. (1997).  
cFollowing Lobrest et al. (1995, p.  S297), we construct four categories of functions: (I) basic functions, (II) sedentary work functions,  
  (III) physical work functions, and (IV) very physical work functions.  For each activity, a respondent can answer “not at all difficult,” “a little difficult,”  
  “somewhat difficult,” “very difficult/can't do,” or “don’t do.”  The last two categories are grouped together.  Respondents were told to exclude any limitation  
   expected to last less than three months.  The functional limitation index takes on values 0-6 as defined by Level 0 – Level 6 in the table. 
dDefined by Wallace and Herzog (1995,  pS89 and Table 1) to including conditions listed in (e) below and asthma, back , leg or feet problems,  kidney or bladder problems, 
  stomach or intestinal ulcers, high cholesterol, and fractures.  We additionally include poor eyesight (with glasses) and poor hearing (with hearing aid).   
eIncludes diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart condition, stroke, or psychiatric condition as defined by Wallace and Herzog (1995, Table 1). We additionally include  
  arthritis and hypertension. 
       
 
Table II.  Corrupt Sampling, Partial Verification, and MIV Bounds on P(W=1) 
 Work Limitation Case 
     
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
HM Corrupt 
Sampling Bounds*  
Proposition 1 
Verification Bounds  
Age and Employment  
MIV Bounds  
Disability Application 
and Employment MIV Bounds 
 
Verification Model I†    
    vy = 1 vy = 0.9  vy = 1 vy = 0.9 
[0.127,  0.288]a    [0.135,  0.215]   [0.178,  0.204]c [0.106,  0.204]  [0.149,  0.193] [0.120,  0.193] 
[0.121   0.298]b  [0.129   0.223]  [0.155   0.207] [0.086   0.207]  [0.143   0.209] [0.112   0.209] 
      +0.010  -0.016d  +0.016  -0.016   +0.009  -0.005  +0.006  -0.005 
   
Verification Model II‡
    vy = 1 vy = 0.9  vy = 1 vy = 0.9 
[0.000,  0.423]  [0.103,  0.318]  [0.129,  0.285] [0.065,  0.285]  [0.110,  0.320] [0.089,  0.320] 
[0.000   0.434]  [0.098   0.326]  [0.115,  0.300] [0.051,  0.300]  [0.104,  0.325] [0.080,  0.325] 
      +0.013  -0.013  +0.013  -0.013   +0.008  -0.008  +0.006  -0.008 
†For Model I (v = 0.919), work limitation status X (but not work incapacity status) is treated as verified for members of the following groups: 
    (1) disability beneficiaries (reporting X=1) unless currently working or report able to work  
    (2) those currently working for pay (V2717=1) unless (a) receiving disability benefits, (b) did not check the “working” box in question 
          F1a (V2701) for current employment status, (c) labor hours are zero/missing, or (d) earnings are zero/missing 
    (3) those reporting no work limitation (X=0) unless also report receiving disability benefits or checked “disabled” as current employment status 
    (4) those reporting work limitation (X=1) if report unable to work due to one of the six serious diagnosed conditions highlighted by Wallace and  
          Herzog (1995): treated for cancer in the last 12 months, diabetic taking insulin, chronic lung disease that limits activities, congestive heart  
          disease with treatment or shortness of breath, stroke with health consequences, or current psychiatric/emotional problem with medication or  
          other treatment 
 
‡Model II (v = 0.784) differs from Model I in that: (1) proxy responses are never verified, (2) X=1 cases are not verified based on specific medical  
   conditions, and (3) X=0 cases are never verified if the respondent (a) reports pain of at least moderate severity at its worst that makes activities  
   difficult or (b) has a serious/objective medical condition defined in Model I and reports being limited in housework or other activities. 
 
apoint estimates of the population bounds 
bbootstrapped 5th and 95th percentile bounds 
cMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
destimated finite-sample bias   
*There are 22 missing values for reported work limitation X; the estimated bounds conservatively take worst case scenarios for these missing values. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III.  Sensitivity of Age and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
Work Limitation Case 
       
 Lower Bound   Upper Bound   
       
 X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
Model I Model II X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
Model I Model II 
       
0.166a 0.122 a 0.205 a 0.285 a
θ=0 no functional limitation 
0.152b 0.110b
θ=6:
very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.210 b 0.302 b
0.160 0.119 0.209 0.286 
θ=1 some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.146 0.107 
θ=5:
some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.217 0.299 
0.148 0.110 0.271 0.357 
θ=2 very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.143 0.101 
θ=4:
very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.279 0.365 
0.114 0.093 0.398 0.458 
θ=3 some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.104 0.085 
θ=3:
some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.411 0.469 
0.089 0.089 0.422 0.479 
θ=4 very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.076 0.076 θ=2:
very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.431 0.490 
0.081 0.078 0.482 0.527 
θ=5 some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.070 0.065 θ=1:
some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.495 0.536 
Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995): 
• Level 1: Some difficulty with very physical work functions (e.g., climb several flights of stairs without resting) 
• Level 2: Very difficult/can't do one of the very physical work functions 
• Level 3: Some difficulty with physical or sedentary work functions (e.g., walk several blocks or sit for two hours) 
• Level 4: Very difficult/can't do one of the physical work or sedentary work functions 
• Level 5: Some difficulty with any basic function (e.g., get in and out of bed without help) 
• Level 6: Very difficult/can't do one of the basic functions 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5th and 95th percentile bounds 
 
 
Table IV.  Corrupt Sampling, Partial Verification, and MIV Bounds on P(W=1) 
 
 Unable to Work Case 
     
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
HM Corrupt 
Sampling Bounds*  
Proposition 1 
Verification Bounds†  
Age and Employment  
MIV Bounds  
Disability Application 
and Employment MIV Bounds 
 
    vy = 1 vy = 0.9  vy = 1 vy = 0.9 
[0.036,  0.166]a    [0.044,  0.109]   [0.049,  0.089]c [0.032,  0.089]  [0.048,  0.072] [0.045,  0.072] 
[0.033   0.174]b  [0.041   0.114]  [0.042   0.097] [0.025   0.097]  [0.042   0.084] [0.038   0.084] 
      +0.009  -0.008d  +0.011  -0.008   +0.003  -0.002  +0.003  -0.002 
   
† v = 0.935: Reported work incapacity (X=1) is treated as verified if the respondent receives disability benefits and reports one of the six 
  serious diagnosed conditions highlighted by Wallace and Herzog (1995): treated for cancer in the last 12 months, diabetic taking insulin, chronic  
  lung disease that limits activities, congestive heart disease with treatment or shortness of breath, stroke with health consequences, or current  
  psychiatric/emotional problem with medication or other treatment.  Reported work capacity (X=0) is verified for workers (L=1).  For nonworkers,  
  work capacity is verified unless the respondent reports some work limitation and the receipt of disability benefits.    
 
  Results for Model II, which relaxes some of these verification assumptions, are available from the authors. 
 
apoint estimates of the population bounds when v = 0.935, the verification rate in Column B 
bbootstrapped 5th and 95th percentile bounds 
cMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
destimated finite-sample bias   
 
 
 
 
 
Table V.  Age and Employment MIV Bounds on Work Incapacity 
among SSDI/SSI Applicants 
P(Unable to Work) Among SDI/SSI Applicants 
  
A. All Applicants 
  
B. Applicants with the Most Recent  
     Adjudication Date Within Six  
    Months of the Interview Date
                                                                                                
 
 Verification, No MIV† Verification Plus Age and Employment MIV  Verification, No MIV  
      
  [0.381,  0.791]   [0.505,  0.751]a  [0.335,  0.837]d  
  [0.357   0.811]   [0.441   0.790]b  [0.288   0.871]b  
  +0.056  -0.062c       
 
Note: Case A (all applicants) imposes the age and employment MIV assumption.  We do not  
           impose the MIV assumption for Case B due to insufficient sample sizes.   
 
†See verification definition in previous table footnote 
  
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5th and 95th percentile bounds 
cestimated finite-sample bias   
dpoint estimates (no MIV assumption) 
 
